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 k .  s abeel  r ahman 
 Democracy and Productivity: The 
Glass-Steagall Act and the Shifting 
Discourse of Financial Regulation 
 In the fall of 2008, the United States experienced a sudden fi nancial crisis that 
plunged the fi nancial sector into disarray, provoked the worst economic 
downturn since the Great Depression, and gave rise to an ongoing series of 
highly contentious debates over economic regulation. Two years later, Congress 
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
one of the largest overhauls of fi nancial regulation in history. Th roughout this 
debate, much of the discourse of fi nancial reform revolved around concepts 
such as consumer protection, the problem of the “systemic risk” posed by the 
failure of fi nancial institutions that could have vast negative spillover eff ects, 
and the clash between proponents and critics of expanded federal regulatory 
oversight. 1 But despite deep-seated public anger against fi nancial fi rms and 
accusations of abusive practices of securitization and subprime mortgage 
lending, the public discourse of reform politics exhibited little evidence of 
more aggressive arguments against the concentrated economic and political 
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power of big fi nance—arguments that had historically animated antitrust and 
fi nancial reformers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 2 
Th is current era of ongoing debate over the role of the state in regulating the 
fi nancial sector suggests an opportune moment to reexamine the language 
and arguments of an earlier era of fi nancial regulatory reform: the debate 
around the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. 
 Passed as part of the Banking Act of 1933, 3 during the fabled Hundred 
Days session of Congress under Franklin Roosevelt, the Glass-Steagall Act 
consisted of several provisions that taken together mandated the separation 
of commercial and investment banking. 4 Th e Banking Act also expanded 
permission for national banks to engage in “branch banking” by opening 
subsidiary branches in different localities—a practice that had long been 
restricted out of concern for unfavorable competitive pressures on local 
banks—and expanded the regulatory powers of the Federal Reserve. Th ese 
three initiatives were colloquially known at the time as the “Glass bill,” named 
for its chief architect and proponent, Senator Carter Glass. By spring 1933, the 
Glass bill merged with legislation pushed by Henry Steagall in the House to 
create a deposit insurance system by establishing what is now the FDIC. With 
the added deposit insurance provisions, the combined Banking Act passed 
Congress easily in June 1933, signed into law by Franklin Roosevelt shortly 
thereaft er. 
 As a substantive policy, the Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of commercial 
and investment banking was seen as crucial to preventing abuse by fi nancial 
fi rms in selling securities—and its repeal in 1999 arguably contributed to the 
rise of complex derivatives and mortgage-backed securities that helped create 
the 2008 financial crisis. But the purpose of this article is not to evaluate 
the empirical evidence for or against Glass-Steagall as a policy choice; rather, 
it is to examine the nature of the debate around Glass-Steagall itself. What 
kinds of arguments were mobilized in favor and against the reform? What 
arguments carried the most political force at the time? And what can this 
story tell us about the current political debate we face today? 
 While most studies of the Glass-Steagall Act have focused primarily on 
the empirical case for and impact of the separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking, 5 there are no studies focusing on the politics and discourse of 
the reform itself. Aside from a few focused histories of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, 6 the Act is usually treated in passing in larger studies of fi nancial reform 
or New Deal histories. Indeed, the Glass-Steagall Act itself was folded into 
and quickly supplanted by larger policy debates over initiatives such as 
deposit insurance, the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
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and more pitched political battles over economic planning and recovery 
in 1933–34. 
 Th e reform discourse in Congress surrounding Glass-Steagall parallels 
many of the debates in our current historical moment. Th en, as now, policy-
makers struggled to conceptualize the precise nature of the economic challenge 
and how reforms ought to respond. Th en, as now, the dominant narrative was 
primarily one where reforms were targeted toward promoting economic 
productivity and stability. Yet at the same time, there was a strong undercurrent 
of a more aggressive and moralized critique of fi nancial greed and excessive 
power. Th is historical debate around Glass-Steagall from 1931 to 1933 is especially 
interesting because it captures an important shift  in discourses of reform, 
from earlier Progressive Era reform discourses to the kinds of language that 
would mark the New Deal and postwar eras—a shift  that would ultimately 
have profound consequences for more recent debates on fi nancial regulation. 
 Where earlier Progressive Era reformers exhibited a deep-seated distrust 
of fi nancial giants, whose concentrated economic and political power was 
seen as a threat to liberty and democracy, Glass-Steagall supporters made a 
conscious eff ort to avoid this moralized, democratic argument. Instead, the 
arguments for Glass-Steagall were couched in terms of promoting productive 
economic activity, specifi cally by curbing banker confl icts of interest, and 
excess unproductive speculation in risky assets. While some of these New 
Deal reformers shared with earlier generations of fi nancial reformers a distrust 
of fi nancial elites, they nevertheless sought to ground reform eff orts in terms 
of maximizing economic productivity, rather than explicitly trying to curtail 
the power of fi nancial sector giants. Further, this shift  in conceptual approach 
was partly shaped by the New Dealers’ commitment to building a national 
banking system and expanding federal regulatory power—commitments which 
themselves ran afoul of the concentration-of-power arguments marshaled by 
earlier generations of reformers. 
 Th e debate over Glass-Steagall thus pitched two competing reform 
narratives against one another. On the one hand, veterans of the Progressive 
and Populist movements appealed to earlier understandings of fi nancial 
reform as being primarily a problem of  economic power and  democratic 
accountability : the task, for these reformers, was to curb the concentrated 
power of fi nancial fi rms whose economic might and political infl uence posed 
a threat to the very ideals of liberty and democracy. Against this “democratic” 
argument for reform, policymakers like Glass and his supporters advanced a 
very diff erent reform narrative, focusing not on the problem of fi nancial fi rm 
power and the anxiety of democratic accountability, but rather on the goal of 
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 economic productivity . Th is “technocratic” argument saw the task of reform as 
one of macroeconomic management, whose success could be seen primarily 
through its impact on economic growth and stability. In this technocratic 
approach, concerns of power, liberty, and democratic accountability took a 
back seat. 
 Th is clash between the democratic and technocratic discourses of reform 
built on a long-standing tension in Progressive Era discourse. But the Glass-
Steagall episode represents a historical moment in which the technocratic 
understanding of the modern economy and the goals of policy were beginning 
to supplant the democratic framework of more radical reformers. Th e Glass-
Steagall debate thus captures and exemplifi es this broader shift  in the New 
Deal era away from more robust discourses of progressive and democratic 
reform toward a discourse primarily concerned with economic growth, 
consumer welfare, and technocratic management. 7 
 As will be argued below, this shift  in fi nancial reform discourse has had 
lasting repercussions. By shift ing the motivation for fi nancial regulation from one 
of power and accountability to one of economic productivity, the New Deal 
consolidated a conceptual framework that was ultimately more permissive of 
deregulatory arguments that arose in the 1980s and 1990s; so long as deregulation 
could be shown to be productivity-enhancing, there remained little justifi cation 
for continued regulation. Indeed, this is exactly the argument advanced by a 
range of scholars and policymakers who sought to undo New Deal-era fi nancial 
regulations on the grounds that deregulation would promote economic produc-
tivity, culminating in the repeal of the Glass-Steagall provision itself in the 
Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999. For example, many infl uential 
studies in the 1990s argued that the separation of commercial and investment 
banking had in fact become a barrier to economic productivity, and that 
combined banking functions would safely promote greater development and 
stability. 8 At the same time, this discourse of productivity shaped eff orts to revive 
fi nancial regulations in 2009–10 following the recent fi nancial crisis: it is notable 
that Barack Obama’s own argument for fi nancial reform focused primarily 
on concerns of economic stability and productivity; gone was the moralized 
democratic language of more radical Progressive reformers. 9 Arguably, this 
narrower conceptual approach to fi nancial reform undercut several of the more 
aggressive reform proposals that were advanced, such as breaking up megabanks, 
instituting a stronger form of the ban on proprietary trading, or stronger leverage 
caps. 10 One repercussion of the turn to a language of productivity during 
the Glass-Steagall debate was to erode inherited discourses of democratic 
accountability, to the detriment of future eff orts at fi nancial reform. 
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 Th e rest of this article will proceed as follows. Part I off ers an overview of 
the Glass-Steagall Act and the historical context of its passage. Part II then 
establishes the key break that proponents of Glass-Steagall made from inherited 
discourses of fi nancial reform popularized by thinkers like Louis Brandeis, 
who emphasized regulation as a democratic check on concentrations of 
economic power. Part III describes in depth the clash between democratic 
and technocratic narratives of fi nancial reform in the congressional debate 
around the Glass-Steagall Act from 1931 to its passage in 1933. Part IV then 
suggests that despite the shift  in rhetoric by reformers to favor the language of 
economic productivity, these reformers relied in crucial ways on the background 
norms of democracy cultivated by earlier generations of Progressive reformers 
to generate support for the reforms themselves. Th is suggests that for all its 
apparent modernity, this newer discourse of economic productivity could 
not by itself off er a durable conceptual and discursive foundation for fi nancial 
regulation. This lack of durability of the productivity argument became 
especially clear in the acceleration of deregulatory eff orts in the late twentieth 
century. Finally, Part V concludes by examining in more detail the repercussions 
of this shift  in discourse for more modern debates over fi nancial regulation, 
including the deregulatory push in the 1980s and 1990s, and the more recent 
eff orts at fi nancial reform in 2009–10. 
 i. the politics of glass-steagall: a brief history 
 Th e merging of commercial and investment banking undone by the Glass-
Steagall Act was itself a relatively recent phenomenon. Traditionally, com-
mercial and investment banking had been seen as incompatible businesses. 11 
But the expansion of trust companies in the late nineteenth century into 
various financial services placed state and national banks under severe 
competitive pressure. State banks sought more permissive state charters to 
engage in investment banking. National banks remained prohibited from 
following suit, but instead developed the “affi  liate system”—a process of 
setting up independent but fully owned affi  liates under state charters for 
the purpose of engaging in investment banking. Although the practice was 
criticized by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1913, no action was taken, 
and by 1914 there was no longer any eff ective barrier between these two types 
of banking. Further, World War I helped more banks develop their securities 
businesses, as both banks and the public became accustomed to dealing in 
war bonds. Th ese trends fi nally culminated in the 1927 McFadden Act, which 
formally recognized and thus supported the expansion of commercial banks 
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into investment banking. While Glass himself argued against the Act strongly, 
successful lobbying efforts by the American Bankers’ Association (ABA) 
and the Investment Bankers’ Association of America (IBAA) prevailed. 
Deregulation and rising stock prices from 1927–29 led to a boom of invest-
ment banking by commercial banks, until by the time of the stock market 
crash they had become the dominant force in investment banking. 
 In the immediate aft ermath of the crash, Herbert Hoover instructed 
Congress to investigate the prospect of separating commercial and invest-
ment banking. 12 Glass spearheaded the effort in the Senate to devise new 
regulations, introducing early draft  legislation in 1930, and holding hearings 
under the auspices of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in early 
1931. 13 In January 1932, Glass introduced a revised bill that for the fi rst time 
was specifi cally designed to separate securities affi  liates from commercial 
banks. Th e fi nancial sector, predictably, was strongly opposed to the legisla-
tion, as individual banks along with the ABA and the IBAA both decried the 
pending legislation as unfairly restrictive of banking practices, and a threat to 
the prospects for economic recovery. Aft er further hearings and revisions, 
Glass introduced the fi nal version of his bill on April 19, 1932. Th is bill focused 
on securities affi  liates as the key catalyst for the collapse of the fi nancial sector, 
proposing the outright separation of commercial from investment banking. 
But Hoover and much of Congress remained opposed to major financial 
regulatory reform, delaying further action on Glass’s bill. 
 As events wore on in 1932, prospects for Glass’s bill seemed to improve. 
Th e Pecora investigation into stock exchange practices revealed in public 
hearings the excesses of Wall Street bonuses, income tax evasion, and highly 
profi table but misrepresented securities sales and other problematic business 
practices. In the meantime, Glass helped draft  the Democratic Party platform 
in 1932, inserting a provision calling for the regulation and separation of 
commercial and investment banking. 14 FDR himself campaigned in part on a 
platform stressing the need for greater fi nancial regulation, as he sought to 
build a coalition between progressives favorable to government regulation 
and rural populists traditionally fearful of Wall Street’s economic and polit-
ical dominance. 15 Th roughout the spring and summer of 1932, banks and 
infl uential business groups such as the New York Chamber of Commerce 
consistently mobilized to oppose the bill, meeting with members of Congress 
and writing telegrams from around the country castigating the bill as harmful 
to credit, recovery, and growth, and generally ill-advised in the midst of the 
recession. But the bill won support from the Federal Reserve, and from inde-
pendent bankers who saw the separation of commercial and investment 
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banking as key to protecting the livelihood of the small local bank against the 
spread and growing dominance of large fi nancial fi rms. 16 
 In the interim between FDR’s electoral victory and his inauguration, 
there was renewed movement behind the Glass bill. Hoover came around 
to supporting a version of the bill, especially aft er FDR’s electoral victory 
convinced him that fi nancial regulation of some kind was now inevitable. 
With Hoover’s support, the Republican Senate resumed consideration of 
Glass’s bill in a lame-duck session of Congress in January 1933. Hoover hoped 
to obtain passage of a more watered down bill before FDR and the newly 
elected Congress—with heavy Democratic majorities—could be sworn in. 17 
Aft er a fi libuster by Huey Long over the branch banking provisions, the 
Republican Senate passed S. 4412 on January 25, 1933. However, the bill did 
not achieve passage in the Democratic House, where debate was already 
beginning on prospects for deposit insurance. 
 With the arrival of a new Congress and a new administration in March 
1933, the Glass bill moved very quickly toward passage. Much of the Hundred 
Days session of Congress centered around a mad dash to bolster the economy 
and stave off  further fi nancial collapse. Within a week of taking offi  ce, FDR 
pushed through the Emergency Banking Act, on March 9, 1933, extending the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation started by Herbert Hoover in 1932 to 
provide loans to troubled banks, keeping them afl oat. Th is initial emergency 
measure was then followed by more systemic regulatory reforms: the Truth in 
Securities Act (passed May 27), mandating new standards of publicity and 
transparency in securities disclosures, and the Banking Act itself on June 16. 
 Th e increasingly favorable climate for Glass-Steagall originated from a 
number of diff erent sources. First, the escalation of bank failures up to 1933 
created an increasing atmosphere of crisis and widespread grassroots pres-
sure for aggressive action. Th ousands of small rural banks had already failed 
even prior to 1929, but annual bank failures continued to rise, headlined by 
the collapse of the Bank of the United States, which constituted at the time the 
largest bank failure in history. 18 By the spring of 1933, whole states were with-
out functioning banking systems, and state governments took to declaring 
bank holidays to prevent further collapses, culminating in FDR’s national 
bank holiday in March 1933. Meanwhile, the sensationalist revelations arising 
from the Pecora hearings further stoked public outrage. Th ird, the success of 
the bill was helped by the decision of Chase National Bank to voluntarily 
separate its investment affi  liate from its commercial bank in early 1933. Th e 
fi nal marriage of the Glass bill with Steagall’s deposit insurance bill also helped 
secure bipartisan support for passage in the House. 19 Th ese factors—continuing 
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bank failures, revelations in the Pecora hearings, the impact of Chase’s 
endorsement, and the combination with Steagall’s deposit insurance plan in 
the larger bill—seem to have broken the fi nancial sector’s eff ective opposition 
to reform. 20 
 But what were the key arguments advanced by the supporters of the 
Glass bill to justify the separation of commercial and investment banking? 
While these various developments helped create an opening for reform, they 
could not by themselves determine the form that the pro-reform discourse 
itself would take. Nor was the fate of Glass-Steagall assured by FDR’s election, 
for though Roosevelt would later proclaim the bill as the “best banking 
bill since the Federal Reserve System was created,” he himself remained 
lukewarm about the bill during its draft ing, 21 withholding offi  cial backing of 
the draft  legislation until May 1933. 22 Indeed, the support for Glass-Steagall 
did not track party lines. For example, Democrats controlled the House aft er 
1930 but did not act on the Glass Bill; Hoover came around to support the bill 
aft er November 1932; FDR’s own support was initially lukewarm. 23 Rather, the 
debate grouped those arguing for a more modern approach, casting reform in 
terms of promoting economic productivity, against traditionalists uneasy 
with according more power to big banks. Th ese positions transected party 
lines, since many Progressive and Populist movement veterans critical of 
Glass-Steagall could be found among both Republicans and Democrats. 
Indeed, the next section will argue, traditional reform discourses that viewed 
financial regulation as a democratic imperative to hold the power of big 
banks accountable were being gradually supplanted by these discourses 
emphasizing regulation as a route to economic productivity. 
 ii. concentrated power, democratic accountability, and 
the break from brandeis 
 Historically, there has been a powerful thread in American political thought 
that exhibits a deep distrust of concentrations of economic, and particularly 
fi nancial, power, helping justify generations of reform movements targeting 
fi nancial sector elites. For example, as Bray Hammond outlines in his study of 
banks and American politics, the early debate over the fi rst proposed Bank of 
the United States pitted Jeff ersonian agrarian democrats against the Hamiltonian 
aristocratic commercial elite. Th is mistrust of commercial and fi nancial elites 
transmuted by the Jacksonian era into a more urban and commercial move-
ment that nevertheless retained its deep distrust of concentrated economic 
power and its commitment to popular democratic sovereignty. It was this 
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democratic populism of the self-made entrepreneur that animated Jackson’s 
assault on the second Bank of the United States. 24 
 By the turn of the twentieth century, this mistrust of concentrated fi nan-
cial power became most commonly associated with the thought and writings 
of Louis Brandeis, an eminent Boston lawyer and eventual Supreme Court 
Justice. His infl uential book of collected essays,  Other People’s Money and 
How the Bankers Use It, became a touchstone for antitrust reformers from its 
fi rst publication in 1914, and was reissued by Brandeis himself in 1933 to take 
advantage of the contemporaneous debate over fi nancial regulatory reform. 
Investment bankers like J. P. Morgan were the particular villains of Brandeis’s 
book, for they controlled not only their own vast wealth but also the wealth 
of everyone else. 25 Th is “money trust” of “banker-barons” created evils for 
society such as higher tolls and prices for services, weakening of competition 
and innovation, and the “suppression of industrial liberty.” 26 Th e concen-
trated economic power of these financial interests meant that they could 
affect anyone dependent on them for credit or for sustaining a market for the 
self-produced goods of farmers and entrepreneurs. All of modern society 
thus lay under the domination and arbitrary will of fi nancial giants. Th is 
“curse of bigness,” as Brandeis famously termed it, could only be righted by 
various regulations aimed at curbing bankers’ excesses and rendering them 
accountable to Congress and to the democratic public. Th us Brandeis pro-
posed the prohibition of interlocking directorates, arguing that bankers must 
only serve one master rather than running multiple businesses. 27 He also 
emphasized the role of publicity in making bankers transparent, empowering 
investors to punish bad banks and make informed decisions of their own. 28 
While the Progressive movement represented by Brandeis included a wide 
range of at times contradictory arguments and positions, this Brandeisian 
defense of a democratic citizenry holding concentrations of economic and 
political power accountable constituted a major strand of antitrust and 
reformist sentiment. 29 
 A number of New Deal histories presume that these same arguments 
about the importance of holding concentrated economic power accountable 
to a democratic public were the driving conceptual force behind the Glass-
Steagall Act. In Arthur Schlesinger’s account, the regulatory eff orts of 1933 
viewed business “not as a power to be propitiated or, at the very least, as a 
partner to be cajoled, but as an erratic and irresponsible force requiring strict 
social discipline.” 30 Unlike other more powerful New Dealers who believed in 
the power of big institutions in business and in government to generate social 
welfare and who sought to set up a national economic planning apparatus, 
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those who were behind fi nancial reform lacked such “faith . . . in the virtues 
of bigness and of industrial self-government, and propos[ed] instead to use 
the federal power to revitalize and police the competitive economy.” Similarly, 
Ellis Hawley argues that fi nancial reform is the one area where New Dealers 
hearkened back to more traditional arguments of the sort associated with 
Louis Brandeis that regulation was needed to constrain the concentration 
of power in the financial sector. 31 Victor Carosso suggests that it was this 
anti-elite populism that drove fi nancial reform, as FDR and congressional 
Democrats obliged public opinion. 32 
 But such populist arguments asserting democratic accountability against 
concentrations of economic power were not in fact the major explicit argu-
ments deployed by proponents of Glass-Steagall. 33 Instead, Glass-Steagall 
proponents grounded their argument not in an attack on concentrated 
economic power, but rather in an eff ort to promote a more productive market 
economy by curbing speculation and confl icts of interest. 34 Th is argument 
began to challenge prior discourses of democratic accountability, shift ing the 
grounds of reform language from one of democracy against private power, to 
one of economic productivity and technocratic macroeconomic management. 
Th ese rival discourses had coexisted for much of the Progressive and early New 
Deal eras, but it was during this period in the 1930s debates when the latter 
began to gradually supplant the former. While the Securities Act had a clear 
Brandeisian pedigree—the concept of publicity as key to reigning in shady 
securities dealings was a central theme in Brandeis’s book, and the legislation 
itself was draft ed and spearheaded in Congress by Brandeis’s protégé, Felix 
Frankfurter—the same did not hold for Glass-Steagall. Th e policy itself of 
separating investment and commercial banking of course had implications 
for constraining concentrations of economic power, and like many New Deal 
policies drew on existing proposals that were initially articulated and devel-
oped during the Progressive Era. 35 But the older generation of Progressives in 
Congress oft en found themselves in considerable tension with Roosevelt and 
the New Deal approach—a clash apparent in the Glass-Steagall debate. 36 
 Indeed, while Roosevelt himself might have had an interest in some of 
Brandeis’s work—he would oft en cite Brandeis’s  Other People’s Money and 
was particularly taken with arguments emphasizing publicity as a key to 
securities regulation in 1933 and 1934 37 —the New Deal brain trust as a whole 
was largely dismissive of democratic accountability arguments. For example, 
Raymond Moley, one of FDR’s main advisers on antitrust and fi nancial regu-
lation policy, saw big business as a key to promoting productivity, growth, 
and higher standards of living, seeking to turn away “from the nostalgic 
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philosophy of the trust busters.” 38 Th us, even those policymakers who were 
tasked with administering the central achievement of the older Progressive 
reformers were themselves reconceiving the task of antitrust and fi nancial 
regulation more broadly as being more about economic productivity than 
democratic accountability. 
 Similarly, Glass and his adviser H. Parker Willis both seemed to move 
away from Brandeisian arguments, focusing instead on the need to promote 
economic productivity through regulatory reform. One of the original 
framers of the Federal Reserve Act, Glass sought to build a national banking 
system as a solution to the problem of fi nancial crisis. “He was remarkably 
free from any anti-business bias and throughout the controversy over his bill 
maintained his close relationships with many respected Wall Street fi gures,” 
writes Perkins. “Ninety per cent of all bankers, he oft en said, behaved in a 
sound manner; but because of lax laws, the other ten per cent were prone to 
submit to their baser tendencies and, as a consequence, gave everyone a bad 
name.” 39 For both Glass and Willis, the challenge for the modern economy 
was not so much one of concentrated economic power, but rather one of 
excessive speculation and unproductive economic activity. 
 Indeed, the argument motivating reform as presented in Congress 
focused on exactly this eff ort to promote economic productivity by reigning 
in unhealthy speculation through the development of a national banking 
system and federal regulation. Glass and his supporters saw this approach as 
the best way to curb the excesses of the fi nancial sector while ensuring that 
such reforms would not constrain economic growth. Similarly, while for 
traditional Progressive Era reformers confl icts of interest arose primarily out 
of the interlocking directorates shared by multiple fi nancial fi rms giving rise 
to potential abuses of power, for Glass and his supporters the problem was 
not one of unaccountable corporate power but rather one of potential wastage 
of productive capital arising from distorted fi nancial incentives. 
 Th e Glass-Steagall Act therefore became an emblematic battleground 
capturing the steady pivot away from an earlier generation of reformers 
critical of concentrations of economic power, to a new discourse focused on 
optimizing a productive economy through selective state regulation. In this 
new discourse, the value of regulation turned purely on its economic eff ects, 
rather than on its implications for constraining fi nancial-sector power or 
increasing fi nancial-sector accountability to a democratic public. Th is shift  
from such a “democratic” discourse of fi nancial reform to a “technocratic” 
one emphasizing productivity instead of accountability of corporate power is 
apparent in the congressional debate over Glass-Steagall. 
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 iii. productivity and regulation: the congressional 
debate over glass-steagall 
 Glass and the Technocratic Argument in the Senate 
 During the early hearings in front of Glass’s subcommittee in 1931, Glass 
developed his initial argument in favor of the separation of commercial and 
investment banking. Glass came to see the key cause of the 1929 fi nancial 
collapse to be excessive speculation in the stock market, which in his view 
was largely driven by “artifi cial” stimulation of stock prices by speculators. 
Chief among these villains for Glass were the securities affi  liates of national 
commercial banks. Over the course of the hearings, some witnesses expressed 
support for the proposed separation, while others emphasized that any such 
reform would lead to defl ation and undermine the economy. 
 But what is most striking about Glass’s arguments during the hearings is 
not his support for the separation of commercial and investment banking, 
but rather his focus on achieving a better fi nancial system through central-
ized federal regulation and the development of a national banking system. As 
the hearings went on, Glass came to believe that the kind of decentralized 
local banking system implied by Brandeisian and antitrust reformers was 
simply incapable of meeting the needs of the modern American economy. 40 
Early in the hearings, J. W. Pole, the Comptroller of the Currency, testifi ed 
that the bulk of bank failures both before and aft er the 1929 crash were small 
rural banks. “I see no future for this type of banking as a system of banking,” 
Pole told the subcommittee, “and in my opinion, it is unjust to the rural com-
munities to subject them to the hazards of a banking policy which permits 
them to exist.” 41 Glass himself came to see the continuing depression as 
an opportunity to overcome “this insuperable diffi  culty” in the American 
banking system, by building a system comprised of national rather than state 
and local banks, which would be more stable and eff ective in the long term. 42 
 Th ese arguments culminated in a major speech given by Glass on May 9, 
1932, on the Senate fl oor to defend his proposed legislation. Aft er fi rst empha-
sizing the need to prevent Federal Reserve Banks themselves from using their 
reserve funds for speculative purposes, Glass took aim at the activities of the 
security affi  liates. Th ese affi  liates constituted “one of the greatest contribu-
tions to the unprecedented disaster which has caused this almost incurable 
depression,” argued Glass. 43 “Organized to evade the law,” these affi  liates “sent 
out their high-pressure salesmen and literally fi lled the bank portfolios of this 
country with these investment securities.” Yet Glass also rejected the notion 
that the country could return to some earlier system premised on small local 
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banks, which Glass noted accounted for the vast majority of bank failures in 
the country. “The appeal of the little bank,” proclaimed Glass, “so called 
against the ‘monopolistic’ tendencies of branch banking, is misleading when 
we come to reason about it.” 44 If securities affi  liates had to be stopped, and if 
returning to a system of small local banks was not feasible, then the answer in 
Glass’s view had to come from a reformed and regulated national banking 
system—specifically one that prohibited the merging of investment and 
commercial banking but enabled national banks to open more branches in 
more localities. Th is is exactly what Glass proposed in his legislation. 
 Th e argument for the separation of investment banking itself was 
premised on the need to prevent confl icts of interest that might undermine 
the ability of national banks to promote economic productivity. As Senator 
Robert Bulkley, a Democrat from Ohio, elaborated following Glass’s speech, 
the confl icting interests between bankers as protectors of their clients’ deposits 
and bankers as peddlers of securities necessitated a regulatory intervention: 
 Can any banker, imbued with the consciousness that his bond-sales 
department is, because of lack of securities for sale, losing money and 
at the same time losing its morale, be a fair and impartial judge as to the 
necessity and soundness for a new security issue which he knows he 
can readily distribute through channels which have been expensive 
to develop but which presently stand ready to absorb the proposed 
security issue and yield a handsome profi t on the transaction? It is 
easy to see why the security business was overdeveloped and why the 
bankers’ clients and country bank correspondents were overloaded with 
a mass of investments many of which have proved most unfortunate. 45 
 Commercial bankers, according to Bulkley, became involved in investment 
banking and securities affi  liates because “professional pride became diverted 
from the pride of safe and honest banking service to that of profi ts, greed, 
expansion, power, and domination.” 46 Once a separation between invest-
ment and commercial banking was mandated, Bulkley argued that bankers 
would once again be better able to advise their clients and facilitate produc-
tive economic activity. Such regulation was needed not because bankers 
were inherently destructive forces, but because human nature compelled the 
search for profi t, and without the separation of commercial and investment 
banking that search would induce some bankers to engage in problematic 
speculation peddling securities. As Bulkley continued: “If it is to have the 
advice of its banker untainted . . . if we are to relieve the banker of the temp-
tation to put pressure upon his commercial borrower to put out a security 
 K. SABEEL  RAHMAN  |  625 
issue . . . if the public is to be protected against the possibility of bad bank 
loans . . . we must keep banks out of the investment security business.” 47 
 Rival Discourses of Democratic Accountability in the Senate 
 In contrast to this technocratic argument justifying the Glass bill on economic 
productivity grounds, the traditional Progressive Era discourses of fi nancial 
reform as seeking democratic accountability were harnessed most commonly 
by critics of the Glass bill. It was opponents of this “absolutely invincible 
thesis” 48 that commercial and investment banking ought to be separated who 
explicitly marshaled Brandeisian and antitrust arguments against concentra-
tions of economic and political power. For these critics, the Glass bill was a 
“banker’s bill,” representing a dangerous centralization of control over the 
economy in the hands of the Federal Reserve and the bankers who consti-
tuted its governing bodies. Many of these critics were drawn from both 
Democratic and Republican Party ranks, veterans of older waves of Progres-
sive and Populist reform movements, habitually hostile to the power of big 
banks. Some of the opposition came from outright opponents of economic 
regulation who sought to defend the relatively free reign of banks and busi-
nesses. But opposition rhetoric also came from the old guard of Progressive 
Era reformers in Congress. Senator Peter Norbeck, a Republican from South 
Dakota, for example, criticized the reforms as compounding the problem of 
concentrated economic and political power. As Norbeck argued, Glass’s 
proposal would “centralize control of everything, especially of credit, . . . 
[and] put us at the mercy of the fi nancial centers.” 49 “Our country,” Norbeck 
continued, “is too large, too widely diversifi ed, to expect one banking system 
to be so versatile as to deal with so complex a situation effi  ciently. Th e American 
people are individualistic and so should be our banking structure.” 50 Norbeck 
thus argued for a return to a decentralized system of state and local banking, 
recalling earlier debates from the Jacksonian era: 
 It is in the interest of the United States that a banking monopoly 
should not be created. . . . We only have to look back to the history 
of the endeavor to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States, 
with its branches in the then leading cities, during the Presidency of 
Andrew Jackson, to prove now, as then, that a banking monopoly 
headed in at Washington is not for the best interests of the citizens of 
the United States. Th e placing of more power in the national-banking 
system is dangerous. 51 
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 Following this initial debate over the Glass bill, Hoover and Senate 
Republicans tabled further consideration until a lame-duck session in 
January 1933. But even then these same criticisms continued to comprise 
the bulk of the antireform position. While some critics came to express 
support for the separation of commercial and investment banking, they all 
opposed the Glass bill because of its branch-banking provisions and its 
expansion of Federal Reserve regulatory authority. Senator Gerald Nye 
(R-N.D.), warned against regulations that would seem to serve the interests 
of banking groups too closely. 52 Similarly, Senator Burton Wheeler 
(D-Mont.), argued that restrictions should be placed on the banking 
industry not only as a check against unproductive speculation, but rather 
as a key guarantee of political and economic liberty against concentrated 
economic power: 
 I realize there are good features in the Glass bill. Th ose provisions 
largely to restrict banks to a banking business and take them out 
of the fi eld of security salesmanship through affi  liates meet with 
my hearty approval. . . . But a further centralization of fi nancial 
control in a few large cities and a few large fi nancial institutions 
is too great a price to pay for the very desirable restrictions 
proposed in this measure. We should have restrictions as a right. 
We should not have to trade off  our birthright for them. I want 
to say frankly that, in my mind, the centralization of wealth 
and fi nancial control in a few hands in New York is much more 
dangerous to the future welfare, I might say to the continued exis-
tence, of this Nation than even the centralization of governmental 
functions in Washington. And I have no intention of minimizing 
that danger either. 53 
 Clash of Discourses in the House 
 By the time the fi nal version of the Glass-Steagall Act took form in the House, 
in May 1933, the discourse around the bill exhibited these same dynamics. 
Proponents of the bill emphasized the need to promote economic produc-
tivity by curbing bankers’ confl icts of interest through regulation, while 
opponents warned against fueling further concentration of economic power. 
Self-proclaimed “Jeff ersonian Democrats” voiced opposition to the bill as 
a violation of the party’s commitment to antitrust measures that attacked 
concentrations of economic power in defense of “the struggling business men 
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of the land.” 54 Other opponents in the House warned that bankers already 
“exercised their control over the country” through their ownership of media 
and economic organizations, and their bankrolling of politicians’ electoral 
campaigns. 55 In such a climate, the proposed Glass bill seemed to critics to be 
a misguided delegation of even more power to bankers: 
 [Bankers] have perhaps contributed nothing to the future welfare of 
man, who have lived their big-business lives isolated from millions 
of their fellow Americans, and who have been paid these enormous 
salaries by reason of a trust combination made possible under 
judicial decisions. It is the very size of these institutions that is the 
real evil. Th erefore, the law that created them has a right to put them 
out of business, if need be, to insure a more equitable distribution of 
the wealth of our great country and to preserve common happiness 
to mankind. 56 
 Th ese critics in the House attacked in particular the expansion of 
Federal Reserve authority, warning that the Fed would act to promote the 
interests of bankers, rather than the interests of the country as a whole. By 
“strengthening the stranglehold of the Federal Reserve system upon the 
public,” the Glass-Steagall bill represented a “surrender to Wall Street,” and 
had “for its purpose the adding of tentacles to the Federal Reserve System—
the visible hand of the invisible empire—that has choked and throttled the 
prosperity of the people of this Nation.” 57 Th e Federal Reserve was seen 
as “a banker’s banking system,” privately owned by elite bankers, and thus 
likely to disregard the public interest. 58 Th ese critics believed, not entirely 
incorrectly, that the branch banking and Federal Reserve provisions in the 
Glass-Steagall bill as written would help strengthen both the Federal Reserve 
and national banks. It was this specter of a national banking system that pro-
voked the critics to reassert the language of decentralization as the guarantor 
of economic liberty. As Congressman Weidman declared: “Th e people of the 
United States are lining up against the creatures of privilege. Th e people of 
the United States are demanding a return to the Constitution and a return to 
democratic self-government. Th e party of Jeff erson will stand with them. . . . 
Th e Constitution is a charter of human freedom. Th e Federal Reserve Act 
is a charter of monopoly granted to a special class in direct defi ance of 
the Constitution.” 59 
 Rather than addressing head-on critics’ concerns about concentrating 
economic power in the Federal Reserve, proponents of the bill continued to 
emphasize its potential eff ects on boosting economic productivity. Henry 
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Steagall, Glass’s counterpart in the House, introduced the fi nal version of the 
bill as an eff ort to restore sound banking principles: 
 Our great banking system was diverted from its original purposes 
into investment activities, and its services devoted to speculation 
and international high fi nance. Our fi nancial leaders went on a 
spree. . . . Agriculture, commerce, and industry were forgotten. Bank 
deposits and credit resources were funneled into the speculative 
centers of the country for investment in stocks operation and in 
market speculation . . . the purpose of the regulatory provisions of 
this bill is to call back to the service of agriculture and commerce 
and industry the bank credit and the bank service designed by the 
framers of the Federal Reserve Act. 60 
 Supporters thus attempted to refocus the attention and ire of Congress onto 
the core issue of investment and commercial banking and the speculative 
activities of securities affi  liates. As Congressman Koppelmann proclaimed to 
supportive applause, 
 the unholy alliance between the brokerage offi  ce and the bank 
must be broken. . . . In banking as elsewhere, no man can serve two 
masters. . . . Instead of keeping the money for the use of the legiti-
mate needs of commerce and agriculture, money has been lent to 
the gamblers to use in buying stocks on margin. Th is bill prevents 
this evil from again occurring. Let us once and for all drive the 
money changers out of the directors’ rooms of our American 
banks. Only in this way will banking become an honored profession; 
only in this way will bankers become public servants charged with 
a sacred responsibility to administer the funds intrusted [ sic ] 
to them for the benefit of their depositors and not for the gain 
of themselves. 61 
 Indeed, this argument proved to be the common ground for much of the 
Congress. As far as the speculative securities affiliates were concerned, 
separating them from their parent commercial banks was a proposal that 
both critics and supporters of a national banking system could endorse. As 
Congressman Luce noted, this “prime purpose” of the bill would be achieved 
through a range of provisions and “nobody questions the desirability of 
accomplishing their object.” 62 Even some opponents in the Senate agreed 
with the need to separate investment and commercial banking, even if they 
sought to do so without concentrating further power in the Federal Reserve. 63 
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 Consolidating the Discourse of Productivity 
 Th us the primary arguments in favor of Glass-Steagall revolved around the 
need to curb confl icts of interest, unproductive speculation through regulatory 
reform. Th e goal for these reformers was to boost economic productivity. 
Opponents of the bill seized upon its branch banking and regulatory provisions 
as dangerous contributions to the further concentration of economic power 
in the hands of the Federal Reserve and Wall Street. It was these opponents 
who harnessed more traditional reform discourses that emphasized the need 
to restore democratic accountability against the power of fi nancial fi rms. 
 But the proponents of Glass-Steagall were not furthering the interests of 
national bankers the way their critics held. In fact, Glass and his supporters 
fought a bitter struggle to overcome the banking industry’s arguments that 
self-regulation and minor transparency would be suffi  cient to overcome the 
kinds of speculative activities that fueled the stock boom and collapse in 1929. 
Indeed, the banking industry attempted to block the passage of the Glass bill 
by asserting the economic productivity generated by combining commercial 
and investment banking. “Department store” banking, where customers 
could find all forms of financial services under one roof would improve 
consumer welfare and economic growth, they maintained. Regulation would 
result in defl ation and a reduction in credit essential to fi rms responding to 
the economic downturn. 64 Further, while it was conceded that some secu-
rities affi  liates had gone too far, the solution for bankers lay in greater trans-
parency and a return to “sound banking principles” rather than egregious 
government regulation that would eliminate the economic benefits of 
combined banking practices—despite the fact that banks themselves stood to 
benefi t enormously from the deposit insurance program that was emerging 
in parallel to the Glass bill. 65 
 That the banking industry shaped its counteroffensive along such 
productivity arguments rather than defending their “economic bigness” 
underlines the degree to which the debate around Glass-Steagall was one 
about economic productivity and conflicts of interest—and not about 
concentrations about economic power. Of course, the banking industry lost 
the debate in 1933, but their focus on productivity arguments was signifi cant 
in two respects. First, it helped consolidate a shift  in fi nancial reform language 
from the older discourses of democratic accountability against the power 
of financial firms to a focus on optimizing economic productivity through 
regulation. Second, these arguments that regulation would actually be 
productivity-reducing foreshadowed exactly the arguments that the industry 
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and favorable policymakers would rearticulate in the late twentieth century 
to successfully advocate the undoing of Glass-Steagall and many other New 
Deal–era regulations. 66 
 Th e political success of Glass and his argument thus represented a telling 
shift  away from a generation where antitrust arguments asserting democratic 
accountability over concentrations of economic and political power gave way 
to an era where such interventions were now justifi ed as reforms needed to 
promote economic productivity and curb potential confl icts of interest. Th e 
democratic accountability arguments Brandeis and other antitrusters were 
seemingly relegated to the vocal but ultimately powerless congressional 
opposition. But these older discourses of reform were not wholly absent; 
indeed, they operated in the background, providing a much-needed reservoir 
of political will and moral critique that reformers like Glass depended upon 
to sustain the reform argument. 
 iv. democratic discourse as an underlying argument 
for reform 
 While the New Dealers did not openly embrace the Brandeisian argument for 
fi nancial regulation, a close reading of the pro-reform discourse suggests that 
these ideas were not entirely abandoned. Instead, they operated in the back-
ground, contributing signifi cant moral and political force to the pro-reform 
argument. Th roughout the debate over the Glass-Steagall Act, supporters of 
the reform implicitly drew on the moral force of traditional discourses of 
democratic accountability against the concentrated power of fi nancial fi rms. 
Th us, while the surface-level rhetoric of Glass and his supporters refl ected a 
shift  toward a language of economic productivity, in many ways the force 
and persuasiveness of this new language depended crucially on the  prior 
persuasive eff ects of the older discourses of democratic accountability. Th is 
subtle relationship between the democratic and technocratic discourses sug-
gests that the language of productivity was not by itself suffi  ciently persuasive 
or compelling. Th is dynamic, where the success of the productivity argument 
depended in part on an appeal to prior understandings of the democratic 
accountability argument for fi nancial regulation, manifested in the language 
used by key players in the Glass-Steagall debate: supporters of the bill, the 
public debate in the press, FDR, Glass, and his adviser H. Parker Willis. 
 First, proponents of the Glass-Steagall Act emphasized the need for 
regulation to prevent confl icts of interest that could lead to unproductive and 
risky speculation with deposits. Th is argument was bolstered by the empirical 
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fi ndings of the Glass Subcommittee, which held that the securities affi  liates 
themselves were more likely to borrow funds, speculate with deposits, engage 
in unproductive investments, and thereby create greater risk of bank collapse. 67 
But these arguments by themselves did not decisively compel the need 
for greater regulation of the sort that ultimately passed. Prior eff orts at 
 deregulation , such as the 1927 McFadden Act, had been justifi ed on similar 
terms as productivity-enhancing. 68 Instead, what formed the increasingly 
implicit and understated core of the pro-reform argument was a coupling 
of this commitment to economic productivity with a distrust of powerful 
economic actors—a distrust absorbed from the Brandeisian tradition. 
 Second, in the broader public debate over Glass-Steagall, Brandeis’s 
arguments against concentrations of economic power remained live. Prominent 
antitrusters expressed their support for the separation of commercial and 
investment banking in the press coverage of the Glass bill in April 1932. 69 
Over the course of that spring and summer, the increasing coverage of the 
Pecora hearings fueled further criticism of elite economic interests. As Ferdinand 
Pecora later recounted, the revelations of dishonest securities transactions, 
tax evasions, and other profi t-generating schemes generated public outrage 
against the types of powerful fi nancial institutions most capable of engaging 
in such practices. 70 Such anger was directed as much against the practices as 
they were against the “great banks” themselves. 71 Th e fi nal Stock Exchange 
Practices report singled out securities affi  liates as “a prolifi c source of evil,” 
which allowed commercial banks to “violate their fi duciary duty to depositors 
seeking disinterested investment counsel by referring such inquiries to their 
affi  liates.” 72 Th e anger displayed in the fi nal report was not simply directed 
against the fact of confl icting interests inhibiting economic performance; it 
was directed against a deeply moral wrong, as “personages upon whom the 
public relied for the guardianship of funds did not regard their position as 
impregnated with trust, but rather as a means for personal gain.” 73 
 Th ird, Roosevelt similarly toggled back and forth between appeals to 
traditional discourses of democratic accountability against corporate power 
and the newer discourse of economic productivity. Even as the Glass bill was 
tabled in the Senate, Roosevelt’s campaign gave voice to powerful traditions 
asserting democratic liberty against the machinations of elite economic inter-
ests. In his famous Columbus, Ohio, speech on the depression and government 
response, Roosevelt attacked the Hoover administration for being enthralled 
to the business elite. Like Hoover, FDR proclaimed his support for American 
individualism, but he argued that Hoover’s deeds contributed to the demise 
of such individualism by encouraging the concentration of economic power 
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in a few elite institutions. “I believe that the individual should have full liberty 
of action to make the most of himself,” Roosevelt declared. “But I do not 
believe that in the name of that sacred word a few powerful interests should 
be permitted to make industrial cannon fodder of the lives of half the popula-
tion of the United States.” 74 Roosevelt blamed “the ruthless manipulation of 
professional gamblers” for the stock market crash. 75 In opposition to these 
elite interests, Roosevelt argued for the expansion of government authority as 
a crucial check acting on behalf of a democratic public: “I believe that the 
Government, without becoming a prying bureaucracy, can act as a check or 
counterbalance to this oligarchy so as to secure the chance to work and the 
safety of savings to men and women, rather than safety of exploitation to 
the exploiter, safety of manipulation to the fi nancial manipulators, safety of 
unlicensed power to those who would speculate to the bitter end with the 
welfare and property of other people.” 76 A return to the high-growth years 
of the 1920s was not enough; what was needed was a renewed attempt to 
empower a democratic public to check the interests of elites through the 
deployment of an activist regulatory state. These arguments—and FDR’s 
victory in the election—helped push the Glass bill forward. 77 
 Fourth, Glass’s own key adviser, H. Parker Willis, exhibited in his own 
writings a commitment to something more than just economic productivity. 
His proposals for banking reform stemmed from a conviction that banking 
was “a kind of activity in which the community is profoundly interested; 
and in whose proper management the state, representing the people, is 
deeply concerned.” 78 Ensuring that banks served the common good required 
aggressive regulation, for “in too many cases in the past, experience has 
shown that bank examiners have been prevented by political infl uence from 
taking steps necessary to prevent unsound banking.” 79 
 Finally, Glass himself seemed to respond most passionately to antitrust-
type arguments during the initial hearings in 1931. While many of the witnesses 
agreed that increases in transparency of bank practices would be suffi  cient to 
prevent harmful speculation, Glass remained relatively unconvinced, until his 
engagement with W. Z. Ripley, a Harvard University professor who provided 
familiar antitrust arguments in favor of the outright separation of commercial 
and investment banking. Th e author of the antitrust book  Main Street and 
Wall Street , Ripley argued that in every industry there would always be a 
group of companies and individuals that would operate for private gain at the 
expense of the public. Securities affi  liates represented one such way in which 
bankers would be tempted often to the detriment of their clients. While 
Ripley endorsed the separation of commercial and investment banking, he 
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did so as part of a broader, antitrust agenda calling for checks on trusts and 
other big fi rms. Glass and Willis did not go so far, but they nevertheless 
responded highly favorably to Ripley. 80 
 Democratic accountability arguments were thus in the air, yet, as argued 
above, they did not appear in the explicit defenses made by proponents of 
Glass-Steagall. Th is juxtaposition suggests that, as with the Securities Act, 
this notion of democratic accountability against fi nancial interests helped 
animate the argument for Glass-Steagall, but the intellectual debt was never 
openly acknowledged, nor was it conceptually developed. Glass most likely 
avoided making an explicit Brandeisian argument due to his distrust of 
small banks and his commitment to big regulatory institutions like the Fed-
eral Reserve. But he tellingly saw such big government regulation not as the 
rejection of Brandeisian concerns with concentrations of economic power, 
but as a critical component in asserting individual liberty against such power. 
 Th us, Glass defended the Federal Reserve and his subsequent proposals 
for reform in precisely this vein: 
 We regarded it [the Federal Reserve Act] as a banking declaration of 
independence. We undertook to rescue the country bank from 
involuntary servitude to the great banks in the money centers. But 
we failed to do that; they are still in involuntary servitude, and right 
now, as I am receiving telegrams of protest form the money centers 
against the proposition to have branch banking in the national 
system, the very bankers who are sending the telegrams know per-
fectly well that some large banks have as many as 4,000 correspon-
dent banks throughout this country which are in involuntary servitude 
to them. 81 
 It was precisely those money centers that Ripley, Brandeis, and other 
antitrusters feared that Glass saw as the key villains, for they “choked the 
portfolios of their correspondent banks from Maine to California with utterly 
worthless investment securities.” 82 
 But for Glass, the solution was not to reject the notion of fi nance and 
banking altogether, nor was it to return to an idyllic vision of a decentralized 
economy and polity. Neither approach could realistically sustain a modern 
American economy or provide for social welfare. Th us, on some level, the 
challenge of elite economic interests remained for Glass as it did for Brandeis, 
but Glass pursued a response through the creation of a national banking 
system backed by federal regulation and under the guidance of a techno-
cratic, expert-driven Federal Reserve system. Th ese national entities acted on 
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behalf of the democratic public—but were ultimately independent from the 
kind of local democratic politics that Brandeis and other antitrusters 
celebrated as a response to elite domination. For Glass, without reforms to 
separate investment and commercial banking and to expand national branch 
banking along the lines proposed by Glass, the country would merely con-
tinue “in involuntary servitude to the great banks in the money centers.” 83 
Without federal regulation to magnify and realize the public interest against 
these powerful economic elite, the country would remain in thrall to an 
already-existing “vicious species of nationwide branch banking without the 
responsibility that properly attaches to a sound [federally regulated] branch 
banking system.” 84 In fact, Glass saw his bill as a truer, more responsible 
populism than that deployed by opponents of his measure. In his attack on 
Huey Long’s fi libuster of his bill in January 1933, Glass derisively mocked 
Long’s defense of “the people’s interest” against Glass’s bill: “Oh ‘the pee-pul’! 
Who are ‘the pee-pul’? Th e people are those who do business with banks, or, 
if not directly with banks, the people are those who are employed and who do 
business with those who do business with banks. Th ey are ‘the pee-pul.’ And 
yet we have all this talk about the ‘cold and shivering and starving’ by Senators 
who have not lift ed a fi nger to clothe a soul or to feed a hungry mouth!” 85 
 For reformers like Glass, these reforms were thus a  maturation rather 
than rejection of populist and progressive arguments against corporate power 
advanced by earlier reformers, to better accord with the realities of modern 
capitalism. But while this approach may have succeeded in generating the 
policy changes that Glass sought, it contributed to the decline of the older 
tradition of more explicit and robust reformist discourse. It is telling that 
while small and independent banks continued to express a distrust of the 
concentrated economic power of large fi nancial fi rms, the bundling of the 
separation of investment and commercial banking, which would undermine 
the power of big fi nance, with national branch banking, which would increase 
it, made it diffi  cult for the constituency of small banks to articulate a clear 
argument and to fully support Glass’s vision of a more “mature” and “modern” 
populism. 86 
 v. concentrated power, productivity, and the viability of 
regulatory reform 
 The discourse of regulatory reform around Glass-Steagall thus provides 
a concrete example of the broader shift during the New Deal away from 
older discourses of democratic checks on concentrated economic power to a 
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framework more focused on economic growth, consumer welfare, and techno-
cratic management. 87 Populist and antitrust arguments emphasizing the need 
to hold economic elites accountable through democratic action and regulation 
gave way to a pro-reform argument emphasizing the need to promote more 
productive banking practices through regulation and technocratic oversight. 
But while the explicit argument in favor of Glass-Steagall emphasized the 
need for regulation to promote economic productivity and to prevent fi nancial 
confl icts of interest, these arguments drew crucial moral and political force 
from inherited and prevailing notions of democratic accountability against 
elite economic interests. Glass and his allies did not openly appeal to the 
Brandeisian antitrust argument, perhaps in part because of their unease with 
the antitrust celebration of localism and decentralization. But they harnessed 
and converted this hostility to concentrated elite economic interests into a 
more universal—and more vague—argument about the public economic good. 
 Th e New Dealers supporting Glass-Steagall therefore depended on the 
political and moral force of earlier reformist discourse. By tapping, but not 
openly articulating, discourses of democratic accountability against concen-
trated economic power and elite economic interests, proponents of the Glass 
bill could have it both ways: they could mobilize support for reform without 
necessarily provoking too strong a backlash from vested interests. Th is may 
indeed have been a political necessity, a pragmatic maneuver to pass land-
mark legislation. But as suggested by other critics of New Deal discourse, 
these shift s likely had repercussions for future trends in American politics. In 
a sense, the New Dealers spent down the political and conceptual “capital” 
that had accrued during the Progressive Era, tapping into the broader 
currents of unease with unaccountable large financial firms—an unease 
fostered by decades of Progressive Era mobilization and argumentation. But 
the New Dealers did not replenish these reserves of moral and political force 
with an equally compelling eff ort at mobilization and political argument. 
 Th e discursive legacy of this strategy survived to shape future debates on 
fi nancial regulatory reform in two crucial respects: fi rst, opponents of fi nancial 
regulation have been able to reverse the confl ict of interest and productivity 
arguments to suggest that deregulation would better promote these economic 
goals; and second, proponents of fi nancial regulation have lacked a historically 
central argument that justifi es greater regulation  independent of its eff ects on 
the economy itself. 
 Indeed, both repercussions have served to cripple the contemporary 
debate on fi nancial regulation. First, a host of empirical studies in the 1980s 
and 1990s sought to argue that banks with securities affi  liates in the 1920s 
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were not in fact selling risky assets, and were less likely to fail. 88 Meanwhile, 
market pressures, it was argued, forced banks to self-regulate by off ering 
higher-quality securities, rather than engaging in risky speculations punished 
by consumers. 89 Regulation thus became a constraint rather than an enabler 
of economic productivity. Th ese arguments were seen as defi nitive repudiations 
of the official justifications for Glass-Steagall as an act against conflicts of 
interest and in favor of economic productivity, helping fuel the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall in 1999. 90 By seizing on the explicit economic arguments 
advanced for Glass-Steagall and asserting their invalidation, supporters of 
deregulation were thus able to gain an upper hand. 
 Similarly, without recourse to a reconstructed democratic accountability 
argument, progressives today are left  without a rejoinder, unable to mobilize 
a compelling argument for fi nancial regulation reform. Th e Obama adminis-
tration’s early regulatory reform proposals were relatively limited in scope, 
with the exception of the push for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
While a range of economists and commentators have suggested that the large 
fi nancial institutions—which are even larger and more concentrated aft er the 
bank failures and bailouts of the last year—must be broken up into smaller 
institutions to reign in systemic risk and prevent future meltdowns, such 
tougher reform measures were not pursued. 91 
 Th e anemic state of fi nancial regulatory reform has much to do with the 
inability of reformists to reconstruct the kind of compelling democratic 
accountability narrative that animated Brandeis, the antitrusters, and even 
helped drive in the background the success of Glass-Steagall. In place of the 
New Dealers’ distrust of elite financial interests, we now have a political 
terrain that seems thoroughly in thrall to the ideology of high fi nance. As 
former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson notes, the very banking institu-
tions that were at the heart of the meltdown have thus far managed to avoid 
tougher regulation because those in government seem unwilling to push for 
stricter regulations. “Th e banking-and-securities industry has become one of 
the top contributors to political campaigns, but at the peak of its infl uence, it 
did not have to buy favors the way, for example, the tobacco companies or 
military contractors might have to,” argues Johnson. 92 “Instead, it benefi ted 
from the fact that Washington insiders already believed that large fi nancial 
institutions and free-fl owing capital markets were crucial to America’s position 
in the world.” Th is ideological capture of Washington by Wall Street eff ectively 
“gives the fi nancial sector a veto over public policy, even as that sector loses 
popular support.” Meanwhile, the banking sector as a whole has displayed 
surprising unity in opposing reform; 93 by contrast, in the 1930s many small 
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and local banks registered their open or tacit support for Glass-Steagall as a 
check on the large fi nancial institutions, while investment banks supported 
the reform as a check on possible competition. 94 
 Rhetoric and narrative matter greatly in politics. Th ey provide a language 
to articulate challenges and solutions, giving shape to the very nature of the 
social challenges themselves. Th e fact of banking practices or any other 
potential social ill by itself does not generate reform; these facts must be 
articulated as a general problem to gain political salience. 95 At the same time, 
these narratives also help construct solutions to these challenges, giving more 
defi ned form to otherwise vague and partially formed moral and political 
visions or intuitions. On both counts—the defi ning of problems and the 
concurrent proposal of solutions—reform discourses are heavily infl uenced 
by prior experience. Indeed, the persuasiveness of reform proposals depend 
crucially not only on the innate content of the proposals themselves but 
also on how they defi ne the nature of the problem at hand, and how their 
solutions relate to historically received narratives. 96 Discursive shift s such 
as those charted in this article thus have repercussions for future political 
discourse, by establishing a new way of defi ning and responding to a social 
challenge—and obscuring another. 
 Decades aft er the debates of 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act resurfaced in 
political debate, fi rst during its repeal in 1999, and then again in the broader 
debate over fi nancial regulation in 2009. While the dynamics of these more 
recent debates are diff erent from those in 1933, it is possible that the supplanting 
of an explicit discourse of democratic accountability for a discourse premised 
on economic productivity and conflicts of interest may have played a role 
in the inability to resist deregulation in 1999, and the relative difficulty of 
pushing new regulation in 2009. 97 Indeed, if as this article suggests, New Deal 
reformers relied in part on the moral and rhetorical force of a present but 
unarticulated democratic accountability argument against concentrated 
economic power, then the lack of such a discourse could deprive current and 
future eff orts at fi nancial regulatory reform of a historically powerful argument 
defending regulation on democratic grounds—and independent of any claims 
about economic eff ects. As central as the New Deal is to contemporary pro-
gressive politics, it may be time to look past the New Deal and draw inspiration 
from an earlier discourse of democratic accountability. 
 If fi nancial regulatory reform is to succeed—and endure—it is vital that 
this belief in the unerring and vital successes of high fi nance be checked by a 
revived concern with such concentrations of economic and political power. 
Economically, these fi nancial centers pose a major systemic risk to the 
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national fi nancial system. Politically, their clout in Washington is increas-
ingly diffi  cult to overcome. We fi nd ourselves in a situation where such banks 
are at once “too big to fail” and “too big to regulate.” Th e New Dealers rejected 
Brandeisian language as antiquated, but they nevertheless relied on the emo-
tive and political force generated by a critique of concentrated power. Today’s 
reformers need to develop their own equivalent, a reconstruction of the 
democratic accountability argument to help animate eff orts to reign in con-
centrated economic and political power through mechanisms of democratic 
accountability. As Ferdinand Pecora himself warned in retrospect, without 
such democratic vigilance, regulatory successes will remain short-lived: “It is 
certainly well that Wall Street now professes repentance. But it would be most 
unwise, nevertheless, to underestimate the strength of hostile elements. . . . 
Th ese laws are no panacea; nor are they self-executing. More than ever, we 
must maintain our vigilance. If we do not, Wall Street may yet prove to be not 
unlike that land, of which it has been said that no country is easier to overrun, 
or harder to subdue.” 98 
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